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This paper addresses the transition to adulthood in developed countries. It reviews the main
theories that have been employed in recent years to explain trends in such variables as age
ages at leaving home, union formation, first marriage and first birth. The paper then
examines the median ages at which women in nine European countries experienced these
events and the inter-quartile range within each cohort. The results do not provide
unequivocal support for any of the main theories. In conclusion we offer some speculative
remarks on what form an alternative theory might take.
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Introduction
Faced with the complexities of the real world, scholars must make simplifying
assumptions. In order to understand how complex societies operate, and how the members
of such societies come to take demographic decisions, it is necessary to formulate and test
relatively simple hypotheses. The formulation of such hypotheses requires the specification
of a clear theoretical basis, while the testing usually involves quantitative assessments. In
this paper we aim to investigate how young adults in contemporary European countries
make various decisions that, taken together, encompass the main demographic aspects of
the transition to adulthood. To do so we first review relevant theories and then carry out an
analysis of data from the Family and Fertility Surveys of nine European countries. We then
discuss our results and consider what implications they hold for the main theories used to
explain early adult demographic behavior.
Theoretical background
Attempts to formulate “grand theories” that explain demographic and family behavior
within the context of wider social and economic “development” have a long history. The
nature and historical roots of such a “developmental paradigm” have recently been
discussed by Arland Thornton in his 2001 Presidential Address to the Population
Association of America (Thornton 2001). As he shows, the use of the biological metaphor
of development was employed as an analogy for society in Classical Rome and Greece, and
led to an underlying assumption of linear change, or “progress”, as the basis for social
transformation. “Describing this trajectory of societal development was the main activity of
many scholars from the 1600s through the middle 1900s” (Thornton 2001: 459). Indeed,
the list of scholars whose work can be regarded as developmental in style that Thornton
presents amounts to a roll call of the intellectual precursors of social science. No matter
how venerable its pedigree, in his address Thornton argued that such a perspective was
“fundamentally flawed and should be totally rejected.” (2001: 460). In particular, he drew
attention to the fact that several of the grand theories used to explain demographic change
could be regarded as falling within the developmental paradigm. “Sometimes, we describe
individuals and societies as moving through developmental stages and we speak of grand3
developmental epochs: the first demographic transition; the second demographic transition;
and, more recently, the postmodern demographic transition.” (Thornton 2001: 460).
Certainly few would doubt that classical demographic transition theory embraces a
unidirectional view of change. In the words of one of its earliest proponents, “Every
country can be placed on a continuum of progress, as was predicted 50 years ago” (Kirk
1996: 382, referring to Kirk 1944).
The literature discussed by Thornton largely refers to the processes of demographic
transition and the form of long-run socio-economic development that is often termed
modernization and linked to the concept of convergence. However, numerous scholars have
also considered the place of convergence in the developed world. Long run social and
demographic trends in Western Europe have been studied in this light by Kaelble (1987,
1990, 1997), while convergence has also been addressed to organize research into such
matters as social stratification, industrial sociology and welfare systems (Erikson et al.
1983, Crouch 1999, Kosonen 1995). Similarly, the explicit efforts to produce economic
convergence within the European Union, as exemplified by the EU’s Cohesion Fund, have
been a subject of considerable scholarly attention (Andreff 1999), while quantitative
assessments of convergence play an important role in modern economic growth theory
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999). While scholars still debate the origins of economic
convergence in Western Europe, there is no doubt that great homogenization has occurred
in living standards since 1945. At the national level, real income per head is now almost
certainly more homogeneous within the Europe Union than ever before. Such economic
forces provide a powerfully convergent backdrop to grand sociological theorizing on
convergence. For example, both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1994) have proposed that
current trends in European society can best be viewed in terms of universal patterns of
change, common to all “late modern” societies.
In contrast to theories that see change as predominantly occurring in similar ways in all
developed countries, some scholars emphasize the role of institutional and cultural factors
in generating diverse social and demographic outcomes. Indeed, Mayer (1997: 204) has4
labeled attempts to find a single trajectory of socio-demographic change within the
developed world as “misplaced universalism.” In contrast, he argues that long-standing
differences in social and economic institutions play a decisive role in shaping how
economic globalization impacts upon life course patterns (Mayer 2001). He suggests that at
least four “ideal types” of society can be identified within Western Europe and North
America: Scandinavian Social Democratic welfare states (e.g. Sweden); Continental
Conservative welfare states (e.g. Germany); Southern European welfare states (e.g. Italy),
and Liberal Market states (e.g. UK, USA). From this point of view, little if any
convergence is to be expected in life course patterns, as long as the underlying institutional
structures remain different. For understanding the demography of early adult life, the main
institutional considerations are likely to be those which pertain to the education system, and
the housing and labor markets.
An additional perspective on diversity in European family patterns comes from the work of
Reher (1998) who points to enduring differences in family systems. He contrasts family
patterns in Southern Europe (based on “strong” ties) with those of North-Western Europe,
where, he argues, ties have been “weak” for centuries. These arrangements are seen as
having significant impact on life course transitions. Similar views have been expressed by
Hofstede (1981) and Micheli (2001). “In the Western World it is not difficult to identify
areas where families and family ties are relatively ‘strong’ and others where they are
relatively ‘weak’” Reher (1998:203). Moreover, “These divergent practices appear to have
deep historical roots’ Reher (1998: 204). In a similar vein, Poos (1986:245) argues that, “In
future, it will, it seems, be increasingly more difficult to single out earlier factors as
monocausal agents of social change over the European landscape.”
From a logical point of view the arguments of Mayer, on the one hand, and Reher on the
other can be seen as identifying two separate forces. Mayer’s line of argument stresses the
path dependence of institutions, while Reher’s work places greater emphasis on the initial
conditions from which modern European societies have developed. The potential
significance of this distinction in understanding long-run social and demographic change is5
discussed by Goldstone (1998). For present purposes, the most important point to note is
that both the cultural inheritance model and the institutional constraints approach imply that
convergence is not to be expected at the national level. “No matter how nearly universal the
factors of modernization may be, once they enter into contact with different historical,
cultural, geographical, or social realities, the end result will necessarily be different in each
context” Reher (1998: 221). As an example of how a distinction between path dependence
and initial conditions may be relevant to the interpretation of enduring differences we can
turn to an example from the field of social capital. When discussing North-South contrasts
in the level of trust in Italian society, Mutti (2000: 583) says, “Lack of institutional trust is
not associated with a significant lack of interpersonal trust; this is better explained by the
peculiar political and historical process of Italian state building rather than by familism.”
Whatever the origins of enduring regional and national specificity, it is clear that it implies
a very different view of the process of social change from unidirectional models.
Watkins (1990), studying the transformation of demographic regimes in Western Europe
over the 1870-1960 period, argued that diversity within countries (starting from a regional
perspective has diminished. A further dimension of diversity within developed societies
that has drawn attention in recent years is the phenomenon of “individualization”, for which
the emphasis is put at the individual level. Some scholars interested to explain behavior in
contemporary Europe and North America have argued that increasing diversity is both in
evidence and to be expected on theoretical grounds. Authors such as Kohli (1986) and
Buchmann (1989) argue that while all countries can be expected to converge in their
demographic behavior, increasing diversity at the individual level is to be expected. This
arises because society is moving away from “standardized” scripts and towards greater
individualization. In short, such theory predicts the “convergence towards diversity”
mentioned in the title of this paper. Shanahan (2000) provides an introduction to the
sociological literature concerning standardization and individualization of the life course. In
this paper, as far as possible we avoid repeating his summary and focus below on more
specifically demographic aspects of these changes.6
Within the specifically demographic literature, the most widely employed theoretical
framework involving individualization is that of the “Second demographic transition”. This
has probably been the most influential model of contemporary demographic change in
Europe since its formulation in the mid-1980s. However, the ubiquity with which the term
has been applied over the last 15 years leads to two problems. Firstly, the term has gained
such currency as a label for a set of supposedly inter-related changes that its usage has
escaped from the control of its initial proponents. The first use of the term was deliberately
cautious, with even the title of the article ending in a question mark: “Twee
demographische transities?” (Two demographic transitions?) (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa
1986). Whatever the caution of its creators, the widespread, looser use of the term can
confuse the business of formulating precise tests. Moreover, as the authors of the term have
noted in later work, rapid change in the demographic and life-course profiles of different
parts of Europe has fundamentally altered the social landscape since the term was first
proposed. For example, when first outlined, second demographic transition theory assumed
that a positive relationship existed between movement through that transition and low
fertility. “Sweden and Denmark have progressed furthest with the family formation changes
that have led to very low fertility” (Van de Kaa 1987: 12). However, rapid falls in fertility
in Southern Europe soon made this assumption untenable. The situation today is, of course,
reversed. The countries that seem to be laggards in the second demographic transition have
the lowest fertility, while the avant-garde of Scandinavia and Northern Europe have
relatively high fertility. Recent work by Lesthaeghe (2000, 2001) has focussed on the role
of second demographic transition variables in accounting for the marked tendency to delay
childbearing in all developed countries and its influence on the extent of any recuperation at
older ages of fertility foregone before age 30.  In addition, authors writing within a second
demographic transition framework have also acknowledged the strength of institutional and
cultural determinants of fertility. For example, Lestheaghe (2001: 27-28) lists 14
underlying social and economic changes that can be presumed to be relevant, and then
adds, “Obviously, this list is by no means limitative (sic).”7
However, while the literature inspired by the concept of the second demographic transition
is large and detailed, its basic premises are well summed up by de Beer, Corijn and Deven
(2000: 117). “The concept of the second demographic transition refers to important changes
in family behaviour, such as an increase in unmarried cohabitation, the postponement of
marriage and parenthood and an increase in childlessness.” As they also explain, drawing
on definitions made in Van de Kaa (1997), there have been “three major shifts since the
1960s: (1) changes in contraceptive behaviour; (2) changes in the level and pattern of
fertility; (3) changes in the timing, frequency and stability of unions.” In all cases, second
demographic transition theory proposes, ceteris paribus, that we should expect to see
increasing individualization of such life-course transitions within each country, but
increasing homogeneity of national experience. Or, at least, evidence of change in the same
direction. That is to say, convergence towards diversity. As de Beer, Corijn and Deven
(200: 115) put it “The concept of the Second Demographic Transition … suggests that
European countries experience one common transition process. This implies that
differences across European countries are temporary. Inter-country differences are due to
the fact that countries are in a different stage of the transition process.” Similarly Van de
Kaa (1987: 12) in discussing Southern Europe states that “The second transition is late, but
there is little doubt that it has begun and will be completed.”
In sum, we can make a broad contrast between the different grand theories in terms of basic
predictions for the nature and direction of demographic change in contemporary Europe.
The work of scholars stressing cultural determinants of the life-course makes for
straightforward summary. There should be enduring diversity at the national level.
Institutional theory also posits continuing differences between countries, and additionally
suggests increasing individual diversity within each country. A further element of
difference between theories involves which countries might be expected to show similar
trends. For example, institutional theorists expect countries with similar welfare state
systems to show similar demographic profiles. Whereas, the same distinctions may not
apply if more purely cultural factors are expected to be decisive. Second demographic
transition theory can essentially be seen as one dimension of wider individualization theory,8
with a similar expectation of convergence to diversity. It also implies a number of specific
expectations with regard to relative change in the different countries of Europe. For
example, as Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000: 165) put it, “Scandinavian countries have taken
the lead in the ‘destandardization’ … and so far no other country has joined their cluster.”
In contrast, the countries of Southern Europe are generally seen as laggards in these terms.
Quantification and testing
Although assumptions about convergence lie at the heart of many theories of social and
demogaphic change, there is a surprising lack of quantitative assessment of its nature and
strength in contemporary societies. This is especially true for systematic comparative
analyses. In contrast, as mentioned above, quantitative assessments of convergence play an
important role in economics, being fundamental contributions to modern economic growth
theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999, Landau, Taylor and Wright 1996). Coleman (1998,
2001) provides a comprehensive review of recent convergence in the basic demographic
indices of fertility and mortality among developed countries, while Wilson (2001) examines
global convergence in the same variables. Summing up his results, Coleman (2001: 26)
states that, “Convergence is to be expected on various plausible pretexts. But the data from
1950 to 1995 lead us to mixed conclusions.” In contrast, Wilson (2001) emphasizes the
speed with which the first demographic transition has led to global convergence in the
underlying demographic parameters of fertility (measured in the total fertility rate) and
mortality (life expectancy). For example, he states that “it is highly likely that by 2010 a
majority of the world’s population will live in places where fertility is below the level of
long-run replacement, quite possibly by as early as 2005” (Wilson 2001: 165). The
impending world-wide completion of the first transition makes it all the more important
that demographers come to understand the determinants of post-transitional patterns (Arnett
2000: 478).
While convergence in measures such as total fertility and life expectancy has been
quantitatively assessed, there is very little systematic comparative literature on the
demographic markers of transition to early adulthood. The early adult years have been9
characterized by Rindfuss (1991: 496) as demographically “dense”: “More demographic
action occurs in these years than during any other stage in the life course.” This leads to
great scope for generating diversity of outcome. Thus early adulthood is a laboratory for
testing the grand explanatory schemas. However, systematic comparative studies remain
rare, with analysis of individual countries still the norm. The need for comparative work
has been emphasized by Goldscheider (2000: 11-12), “It is unlikely, however, that studies
of single countries will provide the answers. Non-family living, both in young adulthood
and other stages of the life course, is part of a package of recent family changes that have
swept much of the industrialized world in the past quarter century, ‘the second
demographic transition’. This makes research on Europe so important.” However, as
Shanahan (2000: 671) notes, “The new individualization hypothesis is difficult to
demonstrate by empirical study because it requires a systematic analysis of the timing and
sequencing of adult transition markers based on adequate time series both before and after
the mid-1960s.”
We are not able in this paper to meet this requirement fully. However, the Family and
Fertility Surveys (FFS) carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s in many European
countries offer some measure of progress towards this goal. In the next section of the paper
we examine median age and inter-quartile ranges in four markers of the transition to
adulthood: leaving home, formation of first union, marriage and first birth. We also
examine the sequence in which these events occur. The time series do not deal with the
period before the mid-1960s, as the earliest events that contribute to this analysis date from
circa 1965. However, we hope that any marked trend towards individualization over the
following quarter century should be apparent from the results presented.
We present results in graphical form for five-year birth cohorts of women born 1946-50 to
1961-65. The numbers behind these graphs are given in the appendix, along with analogous
results for men. The broad conclusions of the paper are the same for both sexes, and to
avoid repetition only the female graphs are shown below. The data are taken from FFS
surveys for nine Western European countries carried out around 1990: Austria, Belgium,10
Finland, France, Germany (West), Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In selecting these
countries we have attempted to provide examples of three of the four ideal types of modern
welfare state identified by Mayer (2000). Sweden and Finland clearly fall into his
"Scandinavian Social Democratic" type, whilst Italy, Portugal and Spain are obviously
"Southern European". The remaining countries broadly fall into his "Conservative
Continental" category. We also follow Mayer’s suggestion in limiting the number of
countries we attempt to study. As he puts it, "An individualizing strategy for comparisons -
focussing on a few specific nations - will be more fruitful than a universalizing strategy"
(Mayer 1997: 222). Our statistical presentation is kept deliberately elementary in order to
enhance accessibility. Experience with more elaborate formulations in individual countries
leads us to believe that the main conclusions are readily apparent in this simple data
presentation. A focus on the median and inter-quartile range was used by Zeng Yi et al.
(1994) for a comparative analysis of age at leaving home, and the present paper proceeds in
similar fashion. The importance of studying the sequencing of events in the transition to
adulthood has been put forward by, among others, Hogan (1978), Marini (1984), and
Rindfuss et al. (1987). A more formal consideration of the topic of sequencing is given in
Billari (2001).
Results
We here discuss the results for women only (complete results for women and men are given
in the appendix). We present a series of graphs. Figure 1 presents median age at each
marker event, Figure 2 gives the inter-quartile range around each of these medians, and
Figure 3 presents the sequence analysis. Figures 1 and 2 come in four parts, one for each
marker, while three different sequencing variables are presented in Figure 3.
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here].
Taking the graphs in Figure 1 as a whole, it is clear that there are substantial on-going
differences between the countries studied. In most cases, these persistent differences
between countries are larger than any trends over time. For example, the median age at11
leaving home given in Figure 1a varies by at least four years for each cohort, while change
over time is modest. In so far as trends are apparent in the age at leaving home, they
suggest a slight widening of inter-country differences, with the clearest changes being
increasing age in Italy and Spain. Figure 1b, giving the age at first union for the various
cohorts, shows somewhat more change, but the rank ordering of countries remains broadly
stable, with the countries of Southern Europe again registering the highest values. As with
leaving home, there is no evidence of convergence, but rather a slight trend towards greater
diversity. Figure 1c on marriage is clearly distinctive in one regard: the experience of
Sweden. This is so different from the rest of Europe, even from its Nordic partner Finland,
as to merit being seen as sui generis. In effect, the social meaning of marriage has changed
more fundamentally in Sweden than elsewhere (Hoem and Hoem: 1988). Not only is age at
marriage much higher in Sweden than in the other countries considered here, but there is no
value plotted for the final Swedish cohort; fewer than half of all women had married by the
time of the survey. Most countries show an increasing age at marriage, and there has been
more change in the rank ordering of countries than is evident in the first two graphs.
Although there is a clear time trend in marriage age, it is hard to see much evidence of
convergence. If anything, the results point to marginally greater diversity. Finally Figure 1d
considers age at first birth. The well-known trend to delayed childbearing is evident here,
but as in the rest of Figure 1 there is no sign of convergence. The spread of countries is in
fact largest for the most recent cohort.
The results on median ages given in Figure 1 will be familiar to anyone who has studied the
recent history of family formation in Europe. Figure 2, however, deals with less
conventionally studied terrain: assessing within country diversity by means of the inter-
quartile range. There is little or no sign in Figure 2a of a marked trend towards increasing
diversity, as might be expected from the individualization hypothesis. However, it provides
striking evidence of enduring differences across Europe. The age at leaving home is highly
concentrated in Sweden, and to a lesser degree elsewhere in Northern Europe, while in
Southern Europe the range is large and increasing. Although the North-South contrast is
more modest in age at first union presented in Figure 2b, Italy remains distinctly more12
diverse than any of the other countries. On average, there is an overall trend to a larger
range, but the change over time remains less than the cross-sectional differences between
countries. The distinctiveness of Swedish marriage patterns is again apparent in Figure 2c,
with both the latter two cohorts failing to reach the 75% married level by the time of the
survey. So significant has been the growth in non-marital cohabitation and childbearing in
Sweden that it is quite likely that these cohorts will never reach the upper quartile. Some
indication of the spread of late-marriage, or possibly non-marriage, to other countries is
indicated by the fact that the most recent cohorts in Finland, France and Western Germany
also had not passed the 75% level. In sum, there is evidence of increasing diversity in
marriage age in all countries. Finally Figure 2d presents the inter-quartile range in age at
first birth. This too has increased somewhat, but the change over time is smaller than the
international differences. The largest change in the direction of diversity is seen in Italy and
Spain.
When considering the issue of different family formation regimes, the study of the
sequence in which people experience the various life course marker events offers a novel
and particularly insightful perspective. The age at which events occur is to some extent
constrained by both biological maturation and social convention. Thus the extent of
diversity is inevitably circumscribed. However, a variable such as the percentage of
individuals who leave home before forming a union, or who enter a first union before
marriage, can potentially vary from zero to 100. As Figure 3 shows, this potential range is
to a large extent realized within the European experience. Figure 3a shows the percentage
leaving the parental home before forming their first union. The range in this variable is very
large, from less than 10% in early cohorts in Spain to over 60% in all Swedish cohorts.
Moreover, the values are mostly stable over time, with little change in the rank ordering.
The percentage who form a union before marriage shows an increasing trend, but the
changes over time are limited in Southern Europe. There is evidence in Figure 3b that much
of Northern Europe is converging to a high value in this measure, but only very tentative
signs of change in Italy, Spain, and Flemish Belgium. Finally Figure 3c considers the
percentage of women who give birth before marriage. As with the measures of marriage13
age, there is reason to regard Sweden as a case to itself. Again, there is evidence of change
in some Western European countries in the direction of convergence to the Swedish level,
but trends are modest compared with the continuing gap between Sweden and the rest. The
countries of Southern Europe, along with Flanders, show virtually no convergent trend (see
also Kiernan, 1999).
How can we summarize the results presented in these graphs? To say the least, they do not
offer strong confirmation of either the individualization hypothesis in general or its specific
variant in second demographic transition theory. Some variables show inter-country
convergence for some cohorts, but more evidence points towards the persistence of national
differences or towards greater diversity. Moreover, it is not clear that the supposed leaders
of the trend towards individualization, the Nordic countries, fully justify that
characterization. In fact, rather than destandardization, some aspects of the transition to
adulthood seem remarkably homogeneous, especially in Sweden. Perhaps change there
might be better seen as the establishment of a new “standard” script for early adult life,
rather than individualization. Similarly, the countries of Southern Europe, especially Italy,
often portrayed as laggards in the processes of the second demographic transition, emerge
as the most diverse and hence most “individualized” in several respects. Some of the
possible implications of these results are considered in the final section of the paper.
Conclusions and speculations
We began this paper by asserting the need to make simplifying assumptions in order to
make progress in understanding society. None of the unidirectional grand theories receives
unambiguous support from our results. Rather than showing evidence for international
convergence towards individual diversity, the results suggest instead surprisingly stable
national patterns in the transition to adult life. In this respect, our conclusions mirror those
of de Beer et al (2000: 124) when they say that their comparison of the Netherlands and
Flanders indicates that “the different types of change in family and fertility behaviour
cannot simply be interpreted in terms of one model of the second demographic transition.”
They go on to conclude that  “If even these two resembling (sic), neighbouring countries do14
not experience the same transition process, it will be less likely still that other European
countries go through one common process.” Our results confirm this expectation of
diversity. Similar points have been made by Kuijsten (1996), Holdsworth and Elliot (2001)
and Lesthaeghe (2001). Moreover, the institutional life course approach offers only a
limited additional guide to the observed patterns. For example, in terms of its broad socio-
economic policy environment it seems likely that Belgium (including Flanders) would be
classed along with Western Germany. However, is many respects Flemish women show
patterns of early adult life that are closer to those seen in Italy or Spain. Thus we echo the
words of Hantrais (1997, 375-6), that policy “should be seen as one among many factors
contributing to a compromise worked out in each national context in the face of competing,
and often conflicting, demands”. Nor can cultural inheritance explain all. Some of the most
dynamic changes evident in our results are seen in Italy and Spain, a fact that seems hard to
explain in terms simply of cultural continuity.
Where does this leave the study of the transition to adulthood? What scope exists for
fruitful generalization? In our view, the most insightful approach will be one recognizing
the inherent path dependencies in socio-demographic change. We need to build theoretical
structures capable of explaining multiple equilibria and the “lock-in” of institutional
arrangements and cultural preferences. Although rare within demography (Kohler 2001),
this approach has a more prominent place in economics (Arthur 1994). Rather than seeing
life course changes as being driven by strongly determined trends towards country-level
convergence, of either the simple form or the individualization variety, perhaps we should
see recent trends as being “enabling”? With increasing wealth in European countries many
of the material constraints on life course transitions have been reduced or removed. Thus,
individuals in different societies are freer than ever before to give free rein to their
preferences. Evidence from Europe suggests that these preferences differ according to
cultural context. Institutional constraints clearly remain, in such matters as housing,
education and the labor market. However, these constraints themselves are to a
considerable degree culturally determined. It is through building theories capable of15
addressing the enduring diversity of national experience that demographers will gain deeper
insights into the nature of the early adult life course.
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Figure 3. Sequencing between events (% experiencing specific sequences by cohort). Women.






































































West Germany 1946-65 199224
Table 2. Median ages at events in the transition to adulthood.
a. leaving home
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 22.8 22.3 22.2 21.5 20.6 20.0 19.9 19.9
Belgium
(Flemish)
22.6 23.0 23.7 21.2 21.2 21.8
Finland 21.8 20.8 21.5 21.8 19.8 19.3 19.7 19.9
France 22.2 21.6 21.1 22.1 20.5 20.3 19.7 20.0
Germany
(West)
21.8 22.3 22.5 20.1 20.7 20.8
Italy 24.8 24.9 25.8 27.3 22.9 22.3 23.0 23.9
Portugal 24.1 22.9 24.3 24.4 21.3 21.3 21.3 22.2
Spain 25.9 24.8 25.0 26.0 23.1 23.0 22.3 23.6
Sweden 20.2 20.2 20.1 19.1 18.8 18.3 18.8
b. first union
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 24.0 23.7 23.1 23.9 21.4 20.9 20.9 20.6
Belgium
(Flemish)
22.9 23.3 24.3 21.3 21.7 22.3
Finland 24.2 24.2 24.3 24.7 22.3 21.6 21.6 21.7
France 23.5 23.8 23.1 23.9 21.3 21.3 20.8 21.7
Germany
(West)
23.6 24.1 25.3 21.2 21.8 22.2
Italy 25.8 25.8 26.7 28.9 23.0 22.4 23.4 24.2
Spain 26.8 25.3 25.9 26.6 23.5 23.3 22.7 23.8
Sweden 23.2 23.1 23.0 21.3 20.7 20.3 20.825
c. first marriage
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 24.8 24.8 25.8 28.1 21.8 21.8 23.0 23.4
Belgium
(Flemish)
23.2 23.8 25.3 21.4 21.9 22.8
Finland 24.6 27.8 28.3 >29.9 22.9 23.3 24.8 26.4
France 24.1 25.3 26.3 29.6 21.6 22.0 22.7 25.9
Germany
(West)
25.8 27.0 29.1 22.0 23.7 24.9
Italy 25.9 26.1 27.4 29.6 23.0 22.5 23.6 24.3
Portugal 25.1 24.0 25.0 25.6 22.7 22.0 21.8 22.6
Spain 27.0 26.1 26.8 28.1 23.6 23.3 22.9 24.2
Sweden 28.7 32.1 >29.2 24.6 28.7 30.1 >29.1
d. first birth
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 26.5 27.2 26.9 28.8 22.8 23.2 24.2 24.0
Belgium
(Flemish)
26.4 27.4 28.3 24.1 25.3 26.4
Finland 27.3 28.7 29.6 >29.8 24.9 24.9 26.6 27.5
France 26.0 27.5 27.8 28.8 23.6 24.3 24.6 26.3
Germany
(West)
28.8 29.9 31.0 25.4 26.5 26.3
Italy 28.0 29.0 30.7 34.4 24.8 24.8 25.8 27.3
Portugal 27.2 26.0 26.7 27.3 24.0 23.4 22.8 23.8
Spain 29.1 27.8 29.0 30.8 25.0 25.2 24.9 26.6
Sweden 26.9 29.7 >29.2 23.9 25.2 26.8 26.6
Source: own elaboration on FFS microdata.26
Table 3. Interquartile differences on ages at events in the transition to adulthood (years).
a. leaving home
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 6.5 9.0 7.2 7.8 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.4
Belgium
(Flemish)
3.5 4.1 5.1 3.1 3.8 4.0
Finland 5.9 5.8 5.0 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1
France 4.2 5.1 4.3 5.0 3.6 3.8 3.5 4.3
Germany
(West)
5.2 5.6 5.6 4.2 4.4 4.3
Italy 8.3 6.6 7.8 9.0 5.2 5.6 7.4 7.4
Portugal 7.6 6.5 9.5 10.0 6.8 6.4 6.9 8.5
Spain 6.8 5.2 6.2 8.6 6.1 4.9 5.1 8.4
Sweden 3.8 3.8 3.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
b. first union
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 5.5 5.9 7.0 6.2 4.7 4.5 4.6 5.4
Belgium
(Flemish)
3.9 4.3 5.7 3.1 3.9 4.1
Finland 6.0 7.3 7.5 7.2 5.2 4.6 4.9 4.6
France 3.7 5.5 5.8 5.8 3.9 4.7 4.2 5.3
Germany
(West)
6.7 7.0 8.8 5.3 5.0 5.7
Italy 5.5 6.0 7.3 >9.7 4.7 5.3 7.5 7.4
Spain 5.2 6.7 5.7 8.3 4.1 4.4 4.8 6.4
Sweden 5.1 6.4 5.6 4.1 4.3 5.2 5.027
c. first marriage
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 7.2 6.6 7.5 >11.3 4.5 5.5 8.1 7.4
Belgium
(Flemish)
4.3 5.7 >8.5 3.3 4.6 5.5
Finland 8.7 >16.0 >12.7 >3.0 6.3 7.7 10.6 >6.2
France 5.4 8.0 >15.5 >8.6 5.0 5.3 10.3 >11.3
Germany
(West)
10.4 >12.2 >7.0 7.2 8.8 >9.7
Italy 5.4 5.6 8.5 >8.3 4.7 5.4 7.8 8.3
Portugal 3.5 4.6 6.1 8.3 5.3 4.2 5.8 6.5
Spain 5.7 6.3 6.6 >9.0 4.3 4.5 5.3 6.8
Sweden 15.8 >6.1 >1.3 10.6 15.2 >6.1 >3.6
d. first birth
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
Austria 11.3 7.0 12.1 >11.3 6.4 7.0 8.1 7.3
Belgium
(Flemish)
8.0 7.6 >5.6 5.4 6.3 6.5
Finland 10.7 11.4 >11.7 >2.9 8.2 7.7 9.5 >5.3
France 8.1 10.7 >8.5 >7.3 7.0 6.6 8.5 >10.8
Germany
(West)
>15.9 >10.9 >6.5 9.8 8.9 >8.7
Italy 8.9 7.8 11.7 >6.8 5.9 6.5 10.5 9.1
Portugal 4.9 5.8 7.5 8.9 5.7 4.7 6.1 6.8
Spain 6.2 7.7 7.7 >6.7 4.9 5.2 7.0 7.9
Sweden 8.9 >8.7 >3.2 7.8 8.5 8.3 >6.1
Source: own elaboration on FFS microdata.28
Table 4. Sequencing between events.
a. leaving home before first union (%)
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
A u s t r i a 4 74 94 85 54 04 14 73 8
Belgium
(Flemish)
15 18 22 12 15 17
F i n l a n d 5 76 36 15 95 75 85 55 4
France 43 47 53 49 37 35 40 42
Germany
(West)
54 51 53 37 42 44
I t a l y 3 12 12 73 21 31 21 61 4
P o r t u g a l * 1 21 32 01 91 41 81 82 0
S p a i n 9 1 2 1 9 2 8468 1 4
Sweden 69 69 73 63 64 63 64
*leaving home before first marriage
b. first union before first marriage (%)
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65
A u s t r i a 4 65 28 38 23 14 56 27 1
Belgium
(Flemish)
14 19 31 12 15 24
F i n l a n d 4 58 68 59 33 96 68 38 8
France 35 49 65 81 25 34 53 69
Germany
(West)
49 67 74 40 58 68
I t a l y 4 1 1 1 4 1 5468 1 1
S p a i n 9 1 2 1 9 2 8468 1 4
Sweden 87 94 94 81 90 92 9229
c. first birth before first marriage (%)
Gender Men Women
Cohort 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65




F i n l a n d 1 22 52 34 31 01 52 02 3
France 10 14 23 32 10 13 20 26
Germany
(West)
1 3 91 5 1 31 71 7
I t a l y 45544566
P o r t u g a l 57786777
S p a i n 37673356
Sweden 48 64 62 41 55 62 61